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Abstract 
Does extra financial aid for the summer lead to gains in completion and earnings? 
Despite being the largest source of financial aid to low-income college students, the 
traditional Pell Grant has had one major limitation: if students enroll in two semesters 
full-time, they will not have any tuition support for the summer term of the same 
academic year. The year-round Pell (YRP) was implemented in the academic years 
2009–10 and 2010–11 to provide a second Pell Grant to students who enrolled in more 
than 24 credits prior to the third semester and in at least 6 credits during the summer 
term. This paper employs a difference-in-difference approach to examine the credit, 
credential completion, and labor market outcomes resulting from the YRP using a state 
administrative dataset from a community college system. The study finds that for each 
$1,000 of YRP grant funding per YRP eligible student, the likelihood of summer 
enrollment among YRP eligible students increases by 27 percentage points and the 
likelihood of associate degree completion increases by 2.2 percentage points, with these 
gains primarily benefitting adult students who enrolled at age 20 or above. Given that the 
federal government is currently reinstating the YRP, this research is timely in providing 
insight into the efficacy of the YRP. 
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Does extra financial aid for the summer lead to gains in completion and earnings? 
The Pell Grant is the largest source of financial aid to low-income college students, 
allocating over $28 billion in the academic year 2015–2016 to 7.6 million students, most 
of whom had family incomes below $50,000 (Dynarski & Scott-Clayton, 2013). By 
lowering the cost of education for low-income students, the goal of the Pell Grant 
program is to encourage enrollment and completion among those who face the highest 
financial obstacles. While the traditional Pell Grant covers a substantial proportion of 
college tuition, the maximum financial aid a student may receive amounts to only two 
semesters worth of full-time credits without any support for summer courses. 
In light of this limitation, the year-round Pell (YRP) was implemented in 
academic years 2009–2010 and 2010–2011, allowing eligible students during this period 
to receive a second Pell Grant in the same academic year to cover summer tuition. To 
ensure that the grant was used toward degree acceleration, students were only eligible for 
the second award if they attended college full-time for two terms and subsequently 
enrolled in at least 6 credits in the last (summer) term of the same academic year. After 
that short period, the YRP program ended. Congress approved restoration of the YRP 
very recently in May 2017, and in June the Department of Education announced that 
summer Pell Grants would become available to students beginning July 1, 2017. 
Reducing the student cost of education should increase the demand for education, 
but the literature on the traditional Pell Grant has found only small positive impacts from 
such education subsidies. Presumably, in these studies the potential positive treatment 
effects on the overall student population have been diluted by a number of factors, 
including (1) the exclusion, in regression discontinuity analyses, of non-marginal students 
around the Pell eligibility cutoff who have higher needs and who receive larger grant 
awards; (2) the inclusion of eligible students who never apply for financial aid due to the 
complexity of the application; and (3) the institutional or individual students’ responses 
to increased financial aid, either through colleges absorbing the increase by reducing their 
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institutional aid or by students no longer taking loans, both of which hurt student college 
success.1   
Given the potential benefits of the YRP and the limited literature on this topic, 
this study examines the causal effects of the YRP, and it is the first to examine YRP 
outcomes beyond the first summer, such as short-term credit accumulation, credential 
attainment, financial aid disbursements, and earnings during college in subsequent terms. 
The study develops a two-period optimization theoretical model describing how the YRP 
may influence student decisions about their “credential goals” (for example, “certificate” 
or “associate degree”) based on the projected returns and costs. The introduction of the 
YRP lowers the cost of summer education; the model thus hypotheses that it should 
increase summer enrollment. The model also theorizes possible responses from 
institutions and individuals to the grant. Institutions may attempt to absorb the increase of 
the grant by reducing institutional support to students. Students may also increase 
employment while they are enrolled during the fall and spring terms in anticipation of 
enrolling in summer and having less time to work at that time. But because the increase 
in funding and the required credits hours associated with the YRP are relatively small, the 
institutional response and individuals’ change in their employment should be minimal. 
With a lower relative cost of education and an incentive for accelerated credit 
accumulation, students should graduate at a higher rate and be more competitive after 
entering the labor market. 
Using administrative data on community college students in one anonymous state, 
I employ a difference-in-difference (DID) approach to compare the difference in the 
outcomes of full-time and part-time Pell-eligible students enrolling before and after the 
YRP implementation. While both the full-time and part-time students were eligible for 
the traditional Pell Grant, only the full-time students—that is, those who enrolled full-
time in the two terms prior to the summer term—were eligible for the YRP once the YRP 
was implemented.  
I find that YRP eligibility increases Pell Grant disbursement in the summer by 
$312 per student, improves the probability of summer enrollment by 8.3 percentage 
                                                          
1 To avoid the first two of these problems, I include already enrolled and Pell-eligible students in the 
current analysis; I discuss the last issue just below. 
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points, and leads to 0.7 more credits earned per student in the summer. These 
improvements in academic support and achievement, in turn, induce completion gains of 
3 percentage points in certificates and 0.7 percentage points in associate degrees. The 
DID estimates show some evidence of the crowding-out effect on institutional or state aid 
but not loans. In anticipation of summer enrollment, YRP eligible students are also 4 
percentage points more likely to work in the fall semester of the first year of enrollment, 
earning on average $146 more than non-YRP eligible students. The earnings estimates 
show a $681 earnings gain per student in their third year from college entry. Subgroup 
analysis of the data shows higher short-term credential completion rates for women, 
higher associate degree graduation rates for men, and larger academic and earnings gains 
for older versus younger students.  
The next section of this paper discusses literature pertaining to the traditional Pell 
program and the YRP. Section 3 develops a stylized model illustrating the decision YRP-
eligible students face when choosing an education credential. Section 4 describes the 
data. Section 5 lays out the DID model and evaluates the underlying assumptions. Section 
6 presents the results and robustness checks; conclusions follow in Section 7. 
 
2. The Year-Round Pell Grant Program 
2.1 Introduction and Elimination of the Year-Round Pell 
The traditional Pell Grant is a need-based grant, and the maximum disbursement 
is for 24 credits in one academic year (fall, spring, and summer terms). That means that 
students exhaust all of the grant with two semesters of full-time enrollment and can only 
apply the Pell Grant in the summer if they have enrolled in less than 24 credits in that 
academic year.  
The Bush administration signed the YRP into law under the Higher Education 
Opportunity Act in August 2008. Since the final YRP regulations were not published 
until October 2009, most colleges did not implement the policy until summer 2010 (U.S. 
Department of Education, 2012). The purpose of the YRP was to lower the cost of 
education for low-income students and to accelerate degree completion; therefore, 
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students were only eligible for a second Pell Grant if they had completed at least 24 
credits in the academic year prior to the summer term covered by the YRP, and if they 
had also enrolled at least half-time (6 credits) in the last (summer) term of the academic 
year.  
The YRP provided access to a second Pell Grant in the same academic year. Its 
disbursement was calculated in the same way as for the traditional Pell: by evaluating the 
Expected Family Contribution (EFC), student cost of attendance, and number of enrolled 
credits for the term. The maximum disbursement the student could receive via the YRP 
was therefore the same as the maximum Pell Grant disbursement he or she received for a 
term of full-time enrollment.  
An estimated 1.2 million Pell Grant recipients benefited from the YRP in 
academic year 2009–2010, receiving an additional $1,700 on average for their second 
grant (Congressional Budget Office, 2013). The total cost was approximately $2 billion, 
amounting to 6 percent of the total Pell Grant disbursements for that year. 
The federal government eliminated the YRP effective July 1, 2011, due to a “lack 
of evidence” of its effectiveness and due to a cost that was twice what had been expected 
(Office of Management and Budget, 2011; U.S. Department of Education, 2011). 
Elimination of the YRP helped to meet the $11.2 billion funding shortfall in the Pell 
Grant program, whose cost had nearly doubled from $18.2 billion to $35.6 billion 
between academic years 2008–09 and 2010–2011 (U.S. Department of Education, 2013).  
After numerous legislative initiatives, Congress has reinstated the YRP for fiscal 
year 2017 under the omnibus appropriation budget bill. The final regulation has yet to be 
published, but no indication suggests that it would be significantly different from the 
YRP implemented previously. The U.S. Department of Education recently announced 
that summer Pell Grants would become available to students beginning July 1, 2017. 
2.2 Research on the Effect of Need-Based Grants 
Grant disbursements should theoretically reduce the cost of education to students 
and therefore increase the quantity demand for college, but so far the empirical evidence 
has shown at most only small positive impacts from such education subsidies. In contrast, 
some studies have found that the traditional Pell Grant has no impact on enrollment 
(Carruthers & Welch, 2015; Hansen, 1983; Kane, 1995; Rubin, 2011), credit 
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accumulation, or degree attainment (Marx & Turner, 2017). Based on recent studies, a 
growing number of academics have found an enrollment increase of 3–6 percent per 
$1,000 in grant disbursement from various sources (Deming & Dynarski, 2010). 
Focusing mostly on traditional-age students, these quasi-experimental studies examined 
grants provided by the federal Social Security benefit program (Dynarski, 2003), state 
scholarships (Abraham & Clark, 2006; Castleman & Long, 2016; Dynarski, 2000, 2004; 
Goldrick-Rab, Kelchen, Harris, & Benson, 2016;  Kane, 2003), and Pell Grants (Alon, 
2011; Bettinger, 2004; Seftor & Turner 2002) using national and state data.  
Several factors have been shown to cause an underestimation of the estimated 
impact of the Pell Grant in particular. First, many studies on the effects of Pell Grants 
mentioned above (Alon, 2011; Bettinger, 2004; Seftor & Turner 2002) use a regression 
discontinuity approach, which focuses on the local average treatment effect only among 
the marginal students around the eligibility cutoff. This is significant because the grant 
size is smaller around the threshold, and higher need students are not included in the 
analysis. In contrast, the subset of studies that looked specifically at nontraditional 
students, such as older students, veterans, and students from the bottom half of the 
income distribution, found positive gains (Alon, 2011; Barr, 2015; Bound & Turner, 
2002; Denning, 2017; Lovenheim & Owens, 2014; Seftor & Turner 2002).  
Second, the complexity of financial aid applications has undermined aid 
effectiveness and disproportionally harmed the individuals that need it the most 
(Bettinger, Long, Oreopoulos, & Sanbonmatsu, 2012; Dynarski & Scott-Clayton, 2006; 
Dynarski & Scott-Clayton, 2008; Kane, 1994). Due to the challenge of simply applying 
for federal aid, many eligible low-income students simply pass on the opportunity to 
apply for or receive a Pell Grant. The average impact of the Pell Grant is contingent on 
the percentage of students participating in the financial aid program. By including 
students that are already receiving financial aid, the analysis that follows in this paper 
ensures a more accurate estimation of the effect of the YRP. 
Third, some colleges increase Pell Grant recipients’ net tuition cost by reducing 
institutional grants in order to capture the federal aid (Fullerton & Metcalf 2002; Turner 
1998). Turner (2014) estimated that institutions on average crowded out 12 percent of 
Pell Grant funding through price discrimination, with the capture rate lowest at public 
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colleges and highest at private nonprofit colleges. Such institutional aid crowding reduces 
the impact of Pell Grants because students are not receiving the full benefits. 
Finally, Marx and Turner (2017) have suggested that grant aid reduces the need 
for loans and that in the presence of an opt-in cost, some students may stop borrowing, 
which in turn may actually reduce education attainment, thereby offsetting the expected 
gains in enrollment and completion from grant aid. They showed that each dollar of Pell 
Grant reduces loans by $1.8 among borrowers in a university system with a fixed cost of 
borrowing. Their results suggest that the increase in Pell Grant funding might make it no 
longer worthwhile to pay the fixed cost of a smaller loan and that the impact from Pell 
Grants should be larger in the absence of a loan crowding-out effect.  
Most of the papers mentioned above focus on academic outcomes. Very little 
research has looked at the impact of Pell Grants on non-academic outcomes. While a few 
papers have considered the effect of Pell Grants on other financial aid, only one has 
examined the impact of Pell Grants on labor market outcomes. Using state administrative 
data from academic years 2003–04 to 2013–14, Denning (2017) identified a discontinuity 
in dependency and financial aid status. Students who were 24 years of age on January 1 
were independent for financial aid purposes and received a higher amount of aid 
compared to those who were still 23 and a dependent on January 1. The increase in 
financial aid resulted in a shorter time to degree and lower employment during college.   
The Pell literature sheds light on several important points regarding the analysis 
of the YRP. First, the impact of the YRP should be larger than the previous estimates for 
the traditional Pell Grants, especially when looking at all Pell recipients and not just the 
marginal students when using regression discontinuity methods. The impact should also 
be larger when focusing on nontraditional students sensitive to college price or students 
at public colleges with low grant capture rates. Also, when a comparison is made among 
students who already have access to the Pell program, the complexity of the application 
may be less of a barrier to enrollment for the YRP. Furthermore, the eligibility 
requirement of the YRP provides an incentive to accumulate more credits, which should 
theoretically produce better outcomes than the traditional Pell Grant, which has no such 
provision. Finally, Denning (2017) and Marx and Turner (2017) illustrated the 
importance of looking at other student behavior in addition to academic outcomes. 
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2.3 Research on the Effect of the YRP 
A handful of studies have examined the YRP (Katsinas, Davis, Friedel, Koh, & 
Grant, 2011; Katsinas, Davis, Joh, & Grant, 2012; Bannister & Kramer, 2015; 
Friedmann, 2016), but only two studies have used causal methods. Using repeated cross-
sectional data from 4,900 students from one community college in Florida, Bannister and 
Kramer (2015) compared the difference of summer credit completion of YRP and non-
YRP participants before and after the implementation of the YRP. Most of the variation 
comes from students who were eligible for the YRP and enrolled both before and during 
the implementation of the YRP. They found that the YRP on average increased summer 
enrollment by 1.5 credits per student. Yet the ability to generalize from their results may 
be limited as they used data from only one college. Comparing student outcomes across 
years may potentially be problematic as student outcomes in their initial years of 
enrollment are often different from their outcomes in the later years. Using the same 
methods but data from all colleges in the California Community College system, 
Friedmann (2016) showed that the YRP led to an increase in summer credit enrollment of 
0.4 credits per student on average. However, Friedmann did not find an increase in the 
external margin of students enrolling in the summer or in the percentage of students 
earning over 6 credits in the summer, an eligibility requirement for the YRP. That means 
that the YRP only encouraged a heavier summer credit load among students who would 
have taken summer courses anyway, without influencing the overall percentage of 
students enrolling in summer courses. Though the studies have results that are consistent 
with each other, a major limitation of these studies is the lack of outcomes measured 
beyond the first summer. As Marx and Turner (2017) have demonstrated, the positive 
effect of Pell Grants on enrolled credits per student does not necessarily translate into a 
detectable effect on credit accumulation or degree completion. 
More research is needed to fully understand the impact of the YRP and the 
traditional Pell Grant. The traditional Pell Grant literature up to this point suffers from 
numerous limitations: many papers are based on data from close to two decades ago,2 
follow-up periods are too short, and the range of outcomes evaluated are too narrow, with 
                                                          
2 Note, however, that four papers on the YRP use more recent data (Denning, 2017; Goldrick-Rab, Kelchen, 
Harris, & Benson, 2016; Max & Turner, 2017; and Rubin, 2011). 
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only one paper looking at the effect of the Pell Grant on students’ loan patterns (Marx & 
Turner, 2017) and one evaluating its impact on labor market outcomes (Denning, 2017). 
The present study fills in some of the gaps in the literature by (1) using a DID approach 
and administrative data from one statewide community college system to look for the 
first time at the effect of the YRP on outcomes after the first summer such as degree 
completion and labor market outcomes; (2) focusing on community college students, who 
are predominately nontraditional and low-income students; and (3) estimating the impact 
of the YRP on loans, other non-Pell financial aid, and employment patterns during 
enrollment. 
 
3. Theoretical Framework 
The introduction of the YRP provides a second Pell for eligible students to use 
toward summer tuition. Students must have already been Pell recipients, enrolled full-
time in the fall and spring semesters, and enrolled at least half-time in the summer to be 
eligible for the YRP. The relative student cost to enrolling year-round and full-time was 
therefore lower after the implementation of the YRP. Building on previous literature, I 
develop a stylized two-period optimization model to predict the impact of the grant on 
students’ academic and employment outcomes.  
To formalize the model, let person i’s cost of education (𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖) in the first period be 
the difference between the sticker tuition price (𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘) and Pell reimbursement. The Pell 
Grant contains two components: the year-round (𝑡𝑡𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖) and traditional Pell 
reimbursement (𝑡𝑡𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖). The higher the Pell Grant reimbursement, the lower the net tuition 
the student pays, and the more credits the student takes. A key assumption is that students 
do not engage in credit-smoothing behavior as a result of the YRP. For example, the YRP 
would have no academic effect on an individual if he or she takes 15 credits each in the 
fall and spring semesters in the absence of the YRP versus 12 credits each in the fall and 
spring semesters and 6 credits in the summer with the YRP. In both cases, this individual 
enrolls in 30 credits over the entire academic year and merely allocates the credit hours 
differently to enjoy a lower relative cost. 
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The cost of education varies with the level of education (𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖) Pell Grant recipients 
choose, which ranges from 1 to K. The set K contains the different levels of schooling 
individuals can attain, including some credits, certificates, diplomas, and associate 
degrees. Since the credit requirement increases with K, tuition (𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘) also rises 
monotonically with K.  
 
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀  [𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘 − 𝑡𝑡𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 − 𝑡𝑡𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,
𝐾𝐾
𝑘𝑘=1 1] ∙ 1{𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 = 𝑘𝑘} (1) 
 
Income, or the opportunity cost, of education in the first period (𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖) is modeled as 
the sum of earnings during enrollment and other non-Pell Grant subsidies (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖). The model 
allows both components to vary with the level of education chosen. The term 𝛾𝛾 ∙ 𝑡𝑡𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 
takes into account any crowding-out effect on institutional or state aid by the YRP, in 
which an institution or state tries to absorb the increase in Pell Grant aid by reducing 
financial assistance to students. Both 𝛽𝛽 and 𝛾𝛾 are positive, between zero and one. The 
opportunity cost of enrolling in more schooling increases with K. 
 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = (𝛽𝛽𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 + �1 − 𝛾𝛾 ∙ 𝑡𝑡𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖�𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖) ∙ 1{𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 = 𝑘𝑘} (2) 
 
Using the definition in equations (1) and (2), the budget constraints in the initial 
period are: 
 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖1𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐 + 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 + ℎ𝑖𝑖  (3) 
 
where the consumption in non-education goods and education net of the Pell Grant 
disbursement is no more than the sum of current income, net tuition subsidies other than 
the YRP, and net saving or borrowing from the future income. ℎ could be invested or 
borrowed at an interest rate of 𝑟𝑟. 
The budget constraint for the second period is: 
 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖2𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐  ≤ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖|𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 − ℎ𝑖𝑖  (1 + 𝑟𝑟) (4) 
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An individual will receive future return 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖|𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 conditional on the level of 
education chosen. The consumption in the second period will be less than or equal to his 
or her future wages and net savings plus interest. 
Granting that the hours of work and leisure are fixed, all Pell Grant recipients face 
the following two-period optimization condition: 
 
max 𝑉𝑉  (𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖1 , 𝐸𝐸) =  𝑢𝑢 (𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖1)+∝ 𝑢𝑢(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖2)  (5) 
 
subject to budget constraints in equations (3) and (4). To maximize utility from 
consumption, individuals choose E weighting on 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖|𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 and the cost of attaining it.  
The model yields the following hypotheses regarding the introduction of the YRP 
for YRP eligible students: (1) As seen in equation 1, the YRP lowers the net cost of 
education and should lead to higher levels of summer enrollment and credit accumulation 
assuming students do not participate in credit-smoothing behavior; (2) with increased 
credit accumulation as a result of the YRP, student persistence and graduation rates will 
increase; (3) equation 2 indicates that the YRP may lead to a crowding-out effect on state 
or institutional financial aid, yet given that community colleges are the least likely to 
increase their tuition to absorb increased grants (Turner, 2014), the institutional 
crowding-out effect should be minimal; (4) the requirement for the YRP in the summer is 
6 credits or about two courses, which should not have a large effect on income during 
enrollment; and (5) with increased graduation rates, students using the YRP will have 




4.1 Data Description 
The sample in this study consists of four cohorts of first-time degree-seeking 
students who enter the community college system of an anonymous state in the fall 
semesters of 2006–2009. Students can earn three types of credentials: certificates (12–18 
credits), diplomas (36–48 credits), and associate degrees (64–76 credits). The data 
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includes demographic characteristics, transcripts, financial aid, and credential 
information up to the summer of 2010. Additional credential data is obtained through the 
National Student Clearinghouse (NSC), including data from any public or private college 
up through February 2012. In addition, quarterly earnings adjusted to 2010 dollars and 
industry codes are available between 1996 and the first quarter of 2012. 
The comprehensive nature and the large sample size of this dataset make it well 
suited to answer the study’s research questions. Completion and labor market results are 
followed for up to at least 2.5 years after enrolling in college for the first time. This data 
also enables the observation of term-by-term variations of students’ attainment of credits, 
financial aid behavior, and employment patterns during the first year of enrollment.  
With the goal of evaluating the impact of the YRP on college degree seekers, I 
restrict the sample to Pell recipients enrolled in a community college credential program, 
thereby dropping individuals in enrichment or high school programs. I also drop students 
intending to transfer because the data do not provide any transcripts for transfer students. 
And although the NSC data provides information on degree attainment outside of the 
community college system, the short follow-up period makes it impossible to observe any 
bachelor’s degree attainment. 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for the sample, displaying student 
characteristics, academic outcomes, and labor market statistics for students enrolling 
before and during 2009 by enrollment status in the first term. The student composition of 
this sample is typical of most community college systems, with a high proportion of 
minority, low-income, and older students. Up to 50 percent of the student body is non-
White. Age of enrollment varies from 18 to 50 with a median of 22. Over 60 percent of 
students have zero expected family contribution (EFC) and therefore are eligible to 
receive the maximum Pell Grant. 
The demographic characteristics of full-time and part-time students look similar, 
except that full-time students are less likely to be Black. Full-time students also have 
more credits earned, higher grade point averages (GPAs), and higher completion rates.  
Compared with students enrolled prior to 2009, those who entered in 2009 are 
slightly older and demonstrate higher financial need. They are also slightly less likely to 
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be employed the year prior to entering college. If employed, students in the 2009 cohort 
earned less than those in the cohorts entering before 2009.  
YRP eligible students are full-time students who enrolled in 2009. They are at 
least 10 percentage points more likely to enroll and earn over 6 credits in the summer 
than full-time students in the previous years.  
To better understand the distribution of the Pell Grant, Figure 1 summarizes the 
Pell Grant disbursements by enrollment status, year enrolled, and EFC, and Figure 2 
summarizes student characteristics by cohort. Panel A in Figure 1 shows evidence that 
full-time students who enrolled prior to 2009 exhausted their Pell Grant before the first 
summer. After implementation of the policy, full-time students who enrolled in 2009 
were able to receive a second Pell Grant for the summer. Additionally, while Panel B 
shows that the increase in maximum Pell Grant disbursements in 2009 raised the total 
Pell awarded by similar amounts for full-time and part-time students in the fall and spring 
semesters, Panel A indicates that the increase is much larger in the summer for full-time 
students (after implementation of the YRP policy). 
Table 2 summarizes the credits earned and Pell Grant disbursements for YRP 
recipients who enrolled in 2009 with full-time enrollment in the fall and spring semesters 
and who still received Pell Grants in the summer. On average, they earned 14 credits in 
the fall and spring semesters, which is more than the full-time requirement of 12 credits. 
The total credits earned in the summer ranged between 3 and 20 credits with a mean of 8 
credits. Over 71 percent of the YRP recipients earned over 6 credits in the summer. 
Finally, Table 2 also indicates that the amount of average YRP disbursement is 




Summary Statistics of Cohorts Enrolling Between 2006 and 2009 
 
Enrolled Prior to 2009  Enrolled in 2009 
Variable Full-Time Part-Time  Full-Time Part-Time 
Observations 7,908 8,183  5,434 5,073 
A. Students Characteristics 
 
 
  Female 69% 70%  63% 65% 
Black 34% 46%  33% 48% 
Hispanic 3% 3%  4% 4% 
Other race/ethnicity 8% 9%  7% 7% 
Single parent 8% 8%  7% 6% 
High school graduate 94% 93%  93% 91% 
Disabled 2% 2%  1% 1% 
Age at enrollment 25 26  27 26 
Age over 19 at enrollment 57% 59%  66% 65% 
Zero expected family contribution 57% 61%  62% 71% 
Expected family contribution in term 1 942 757  874 587 
Pell amount in term 1 1,918 1,578  2,347 1,939 
B. Academic outcomes      
GPA term 1 3.09 2.08  3.13 1.98 
GPA year 1 2.89 1.97  2.93 1.89 
Credits earned term 1 14 6  13 6 
Credits earned year 1 25 11  26 11 
Enrolled first summer 29% 15%  41% 17% 
Credits enrolled first summer 2 1  3 1 
Credits earned first summer 2 1  3 1 
Earned over six credits in summer 15% 4%  25% 7% 
Earned certificate within 2.5 years 5.3% 1.7%  6.1% 1.5% 
Earned diploma within 2.5 years 3.4% 0.9%  3.9% 0.6% 
Earned associate degree within 2.5 years 4.5% 0.5%  5.7% 0.5% 
C. Employment  
  
 
  Ever employed 1 year prior to college 73% 77%  67% 69% 














Student Characteristics by Cohort 
A. Zero EFC B. Expected Family Contribution in First Term 
 
C. Earnings 1 Year Prior to Enrollment D. Full-Time Status 
 
 










Credits earned term 1 14.1 
Credits earned term 2 14.5 
Credits earned term 3 8.0 
Credits enrolled first summer 8.4 
Earned over 6 credits in summer 71% 
Pell amount in term 1 $2,315 
Pell amount in term 2 $2,320 
Pell amount in term 3 $1,529 
 
As discussed above, one of the key assumptions of the model is that credit-
smoothing does not occur. If credit-smoothing occurs, than the YRP may not have a 
meaningful academic effect. Specifically, the YRP may encourage students that would 
have taken more than a full-time load to adjust their credit-taking pattern to benefit 
financially from the YRP without increasing their credits enrolled for the entire year. 
Figure 3 shows the distribution of the total credits enrolled in during the first term for 
students starting between 2006 and 2009. It rules out the possibility of credit-smoothing 
as the distributions are similar across all years. 
 
Figure 3  
The Distribution of Total First-Term Credits
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5. Estimation Strategy 
5.1 Difference-in-Difference Model 
To examine the effect of the YRP on student outcomes, this paper follows 
previous research by using a difference-in-difference strategy to compare the differences 
in the outcomes of full-time and part-time students enrolling before and after the YRP 
implementation. The key equation is: 
 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛾𝛾𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽(𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖) + 𝜎𝜎𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 
where 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖  is the outcome of interest, such as enrollment and credits earned in the summer, 
completion rates, financial aid, employment rates, and earnings in subsequent terms and 
years.  
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  is a binary variable which equals to 1 if individual i enrolls in college for 
the first time after the implementation of the YRP. It estimates the general cohort effect 
of enrolling after the summer of 2008. 𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  equals 1 if an individual attends college 
full-time in the first semester. Since students must enroll in at least 24 credits in the fall 
and spring semesters to be eligible for the YRP, enrolling part-time in the first semester 
makes it very difficult to receive the YRP. Though students can enroll in a more than 
full-time credit load in the second semester, only five percent of the YRP recipients are 
part-time in their first term. This variable essentially also captures any systematic 
differences in outcomes between full-time and part-time students. 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  is the 
interaction between 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  and 𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 , which captures the effect of the YRP.  
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖  is a vector of demographic characteristics, such as race/ethnicity, gender, high 
school graduation status, GPA, credits earned in the first term, expected family 
contribution, and Pell Grant disbursement in the first term, college, and major fixed 
effects. Years of work experience and its squared term are also controls for any 
regression with employment outcomes. 
5.2 Evaluation of the DID Assumptions  
I address two concerns that may potentially violate the parallel trend assumption 
required for DID analysis. First, the recession in 2008 may have changed the composition 
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of the cohort enrolling in the fall of 2009, making it unsuitable for comparison with the 
prior cohorts. The 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  variable captures some of the cohort-specific effects. Controlling 
for first semester financial aid and academic information in all regressions also removes 
effects that are attributed to socioeconomic status or ability. Figure 2 also confirms that 
the student composition of the 2009 cohort is similar to prior cohorts in terms of the 
percentage of students with zero EFC, EFC in the first term (fall), earnings one year prior 
to enrollment, percentage with full-time status, credits earned in the first term, and GPA 
in the first term. 
Second, the recession may also have influenced the composition of full-time or 
part-time students in different ways. Reassuringly, Panel D of Figure 2 shows that the 
percentage of full-time students remains at 52 percent between 2008 and 2009. Figure 4 
also shows that the composition of these two groups of students is comparable across 
years in terms of the percentage of minority students and the percentage who graduated 
from high school. The EFC of part-time students enrolled in 2009 looks slightly lower 
than that of previous cohorts. Yet the differences do not affect the credits earned in the 
fall and spring terms. As expected, the credits earned in the summer spike with the full-
time students enrolled in 2009 and not with part-time students or students enrolled before 
2009. 
I also conducted subgroup analysis of students in the sample who have intent to 
enroll in a certificate or diploma program. These students are likely to have different 
goals and responses to the YRP than students enrolled in an associate degree program. 
They face lower credit requirements and may therefore be more incentivized by the YRP 
to graduate faster. Figure 5 confirms that the percentages of students with the intent to 
enroll in certificate programs are similar across cohorts and across students with different 
enrollment statuses. Similar to the full sample, the student composition is stable across 
cohorts for all characteristics with the slight exception of the percentage of students with 
zero EFC. The percentage of students intending to enroll in associate degree programs 
with zero EFC increases slightly over time.  
Section 6 (Results) below also provides event study plots to evaluate the year-by-
year trend for a set of outcomes adjusted for the year trend, full-time or part-time trend, 
and other covariates.  
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Figure 4 










6.1 Summer Enrollment 
Table 3 shows estimates of the effect of YRP eligibility on academic outcomes of 
the first summer terms. Each row is for a separate regression and shows the coefficient of 
the interaction term between 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  and 𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 . Panels 1–4 test whether the introduction 
of the YRP affects the Pell disbursements and summer course-taking patterns among 
eligible students. Without controlling for any other variables, the estimated effects of 
YRP eligibility are $321 per student for the whole sample and $488 per student for those 
enrolled in certificate programs. The estimates remain stable after adding covariates.  
In panels 2 and 3, the DID estimates of the effect of YRP eligibility on the 
probability of summer enrollment and credits earned are 8.3 percentage points and 0.7 
credits per student respectively when including covariates. Panel 4 measures the impact 
of YRP eligibility on summer enrollment in an alternative way. One of the eligibility 
requirements for the YRP is that students must be enrolled in 6 credits in the summer. 
Panel 4 indicates that eligible students are 5.5 percentage points more likely to have 
earned over 6 credits in the summer.  
Consistent with the idea that students in certificate and diploma programs may be 
more incentivized by the YRP to graduate faster (see Section 5.2 above), the estimates on 
summer outcomes (panels 2–4) for students enrolled in certificate or diploma programs 




DID Estimates of the Effect of YRP Eligibility on Academic Outcomes in the First Summer 
Outcomes Post*Full-Time SE N 
Include 
Covariates 
Enrolled in Short-Term 
Programs 
1. Pell amount in summer 321*** [13] 26,598   
 
312*** [13] 26,598 X  
 
488*** [48] 2,632  X 
 
469*** [46] 2,632 X X 
2. Took class in Summer 0.093*** [0.010] 26,598   
 
0.083*** [0.010] 26,598 X 
 
 




0.144*** [0.032] 2,632 X X 
3. Credits earned in summer 0.768*** [0.074] 26,598   
 
0.698*** [0.069] 26,598 X  
 
1.393*** [0.265] 2,632  X 
 
1.287*** [0.253] 2,632 X X 
4.Earned over six credits in summer 0.060*** [0.007] 26,598   
0.055*** [0.007] 26,598 X  
0.117*** [0.026] 2,632  X 
0.115*** [0.025] 2,632 X X 
Note. Each row is for a separate regression. Coefficients are for the interaction of post-2008 indicator variable with full-time 
enrollment status in the first term. Robust standard errors are in brackets. All specifications include post-2008 indicator variable and 
full-time enrollment status in the first term. The regressions with covariates control for race/ethnicity, gender, high school 
graduation status, grade point average and credits earned in the first term, expected family contribution, and Pell Grant amount in 
the first term, intent at college entry, and college and major fixed effects. Credits earned in the first term is not included as a 
covariate when it is the outcome variable. 
***p < .01, **p < .05, * p < .1. 
  
6.2 Credits Earned and Degree Completion 
To explore whether students engage in credit-smoothing behavior as a result of 
the YRP, panels 1 and 2 of Table 4 display the estimates on credits earned in each 
semester and find no evidence for any smoothing behavior. 
Panels 3–5 estimate the impact of the YRP on completion rates. The DID estimate 
for certificate attainment is 0.3 percent and not statistically significant using the entire 
sample, yet it is 3 percent and statistically significant for students with an intention to 
earn a certificate.  
There is no impact on diploma completion rates, but the completion rate for 
associate degrees is 0.7 percentage points higher among those eligible for the YRP.  
It is important to point out that the majority of certificate holders have excess 
credits or credits that do not count toward their credential. On average, certificate holders 
earned 21 credits in the first year, which is more than the 12 to 18 credits required for 
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certificate programs. This finding suggests that increasing academic advisement to 
students in these programs could facilitate more efficient use of federal funding and 




DID Estimates of the Effect of YRP Eligibility on Academic Outcomes of the First 3 Years 
Outcomes Post*Full-Time SE N 
Include 
Covariates 
Enrolled in Short-Term 
Programs 
1.Credits earned in fall 0.101 [0.092] 26,598   
 
-0.003 [0.089] 26,598 X  
 
-0.098 [0.317] 2,632  X 
 
-0.134 [0.312] 2,632 X X 
2. Credits earned in the spring 0.278** [0.134] 26,598   
 
0.029 [0.116] 26,598 X  
 
0.141 [0.458] 2,632  X 
 
-0.084 [0.407] 2,632 X X 
3. Earned certificate in one year 0.005* [0.003] 26,598   
 
0.003 [0.003] 26,598 X  
 
0.032** [0.015] 2,632  X 
 
0.034** [0.015] 2,632 X X 
4. Earned diploma in 2.5 years 0.006* [0.003] 26,598   
 
0.005 [0.003] 26,598 X 
 
 




-0.011 [0.011] 2,632 X X 
5. Earned associate degree in 2.5 years 0.011*** [0.004] 26,598   
0.007* [0.004] 26,598 X  
0.011 [0.012] 2,632  X 
0.010 [0.013] 2,632 X X 
Note. Each row is for a separate regression. Coefficients are for the interaction of post-2008 indicator variable with full-time 
enrollment status in the first term. Robust standard errors are in brackets. All specifications include post-2008 indicator variable and 
full-time enrollment status in the first term. The regressions with covariates control for race/ethnicity, gender, high school 
graduation status, grade point average and credits earned in the first term, expected family contribution, and Pell Grant amount in 
the first term, intent at college entry, and college and major fixed effects. Credits earned in the first term is not included as a 
covariate when it is the outcome variable. 
***p < .01, **p < .05, * p < .1. 
 
6.3 Financial Aid 
Table 5 shows the effect of the YRP on various financial aid outcomes. Recent 
literature suggests that a more generous grant may have a crowding-out effect on other 
financial aid. Marx and Turner (2017) found an over 100 percent reduction in loans as a 
result of increased Pell disbursements within $1,000 of the Pell Grant eligibility threshold 
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when there is a fixed cost in borrowing. The amount of the YRP is relatively small; 




DID Estimates of the Effect of YRP on Financial Aid Outcomes 






1. Loan in the fall 19 [16] 26,598 
  
 
7 [15] 26,598 X 
 
 




-27 [48] 2,632 X X 
2. Loan in the spring 37** [18] 26,598     
 
23 [17] 26,598 X 
 
 




-69 [57] 2,632 X X 
3. Loan in the summer -1 [7] 26,598 
  
 
-3 [7] 26,598 X 
 
 




13 [24] 2,632 X X 
4. Other aid in the fall (non-Pell or loan) 64*** [18] 26,598     
71*** [17] 26,598 X 
 
 




37 [42] 2,632 X X 
5.Other aid in the spring (non-Pell or loan) -145*** [12] 26,598 
  
 
-142*** [11] 26,598 X 
 
 




-121*** [36] 2,632 X X 
6. Other aid in the summer (non-Pell or loan) -4** [2] 26,598     
 
-6*** [2] 26,598 X 
 
 
-5 [7] 2,632 
 
X 
  -7 [7] 2,632 X X 
Note. Each row is for a separate regression. Coefficients are for the interaction of post-2008 indicator variable with full-time 
enrollment status in the first term. Robust standard errors are in brackets. All specifications include post-2008 indicator variable and 
full-time enrollment status in the first term. The regressions with covariates control for race/ethnicity, gender, high school 
graduation status, grade point average and credits earned in the first term, expected family contribution, and Pell Grant amount in 
the first term, intent at college entry, and college and major fixed effects. 




Turner (2014) found that institutions may try to capture the increase in the federal 
grant by reducing institutional aid. Panels 4–6 show that the estimates for other aid, 
excluding the federal Pell Grants or loans, are positive in the fall semester and negative in 
the spring semester. Overall, the net effect on state and institutional aid—which is the 
sum of the coefficients over fall  ($71), spring (-$142), and summer terms (-$6)—is about 
-$77, or 25 percent, of the gains in the YRP ($312) for the first year for the whole sample 
and -$121 for students with intent to complete a certificate. Accordingly, these results 
show some evidence of the crowding-out effect. 
6.4 Labor Market Outcomes 
The last set of outcomes concerns the probability of employment and earnings 
during and after enrollment up to three years from college entry. Tables 1 and 2 show that 
YRP eligible students and YRP recipients on average take 8.4 credits in the summer. In 
anticipation of less time for employment during the summer, some YRP eligible students 
may increase employment during the academic year. The impact should be minimal 
given that the additional course load is small. Table 6 indicates that the probability of 
employment is 3.7 percentage points higher with an average increase in earnings of $146 
in the fall for the full sample. Otherwise, no employment impact is found in the spring or 
the summer terms. 
Panels 1–3 of Table 7 present the DID estimates of the impact of YRP eligibility 
on the probability of employment in the first three years from college entry. There are no 
statistically significant impacts of YRP eligibility on these outcomes.  
Most students are still in school during the first two years from college entry. As a 
result, the introduction of the YRP also does not seem to influence the earnings of YRP 
eligible students in the first two years. Yet panel 6 indicates that the YRP induces an 
increase in earnings in the third year from college entry of $681 for the entire sample and 
$1,390 for those in certificate programs. These results suggest that the YRP may be 
beneficial not only for individuals but for society as a whole through an increase in 





DID Estimates of the Effect of YRP Eligibility on Labor Market Outcomes in the First Year 





1. Employed in the fall 0.024* [0.012] 26,598   
 
0.037*** [0.012] 26,598 X  
 
0.029 [0.040] 2,632  X 
 
0.044 [0.040] 2,632 X X 
2. Employed in the spring -0.003 [0.012] 26,598   
 
0.009 [0.012] 26,598 X  
 
-0.035 [0.040] 2,632  X 
 
-0.035 [0.040] 2,632 X X 
3. Employed in the summer -0.021* [0.012] 26,598   
 
-0.010 [0.012] 26,598 X  
 
-0.026 [0.041] 2,632  X 
 
-0.023 [0.040] 2,632 X X 
7. Earnings in the fall 97* [56] 26,598   
 
146*** [55] 26,598 X  
 
162 [197] 2,632  X 
 
152 [196] 2,632 X X 
8. Earnings in the spring 26 [103] 26,598   
 
96 [100] 26,598 X  
 
135 [383] 2,632  X 
 
115 [387] 2,632 X X 
9. Earnings in the summer -35 [60] 26,598   
 
-7 [59] 26,598 X  
 
198 [233] 2,632  X 
 
121 [231] 2,632 X X 
Note. Each row is for a separate regression. Coefficients are for the interaction of post-2008 indicator variable with 
full-time enrollment status in the first term. Robust standard errors are in brackets. All specifications include post-
2008 indicator variable and full-time enrollment status in the first term. The regressions with covariates control for 
year of work experience and its squared term, race/ethnicity, gender, high school graduation status, grade point 
average and credits earned in the first term, expected family contribution and Pell grant amount in the first term, 
intent at college entry, and college and major fixed effects. 





DID Estimates of the Effect of YRP Eligibility on Labor Market Outcomes in the First Three Years 





1. Employed in the first year -0.000 [0.012] 26,598   
 
0.010 [0.011] 26,598 X  
 
-0.011 [0.039] 2,632  X 
 
-0.007 [0.039] 2,632 X X 
2. Employed in the second year -0.002 [0.011] 26,598   
 
0.007 [0.011] 26,598 X  
 
0.007 [0.038] 2,632  X 
 
0.008 [0.037] 2,632 X X 
3. Employed in the third year -0.001 [0.012] 26,598   
 
0.009 [0.011] 26,598 X  
 
-0.022 [0.038] 2,632  X 
 
-0.018 [0.037] 2,632 X X 
4. Earnings in the first year 80 [201] 26,598   
 
227 [195] 26,598 X  
 
486 [739] 2,632  X 
 
375 [738] 2,632 X X 
5. Earnings in the second year 310 [263] 26,598   
 
407 [265] 26,598 X  
 
1,172 [990] 2,632  X 
 
953 [959] 2,632 X X 
6. Earnings in the third year 609*** [184] 26,598   
 
681*** [179] 26,598 X  
 
1,433** [648] 2,632  X 
  1,390** [637] 2,632 X X 
Note. Each row is for a separate regression. Coefficients are for the interaction of post-2008 indicator variable with full-time 
enrollment status in the first term. Robust standard errors are in brackets. All specifications include post-2008 indicator variable 
and full-time enrollment status in the first term. The regressions with covariates control for year of work experience and its 
squared term, race/ethnicity, gender, high school graduation status, grade point average and credits earned in the first term, 
expected family contribution and Pell grant amount in the first term, intent at college entry, and college and major fixed effects. 
 
***p < .01, **p < .05, * p < .1.  
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6.5 Subgroup Analysis 
Table 8 shows a set of key estimates on academic and employment outcomes by gender 
and by whether students were enrolled in a certificate program. The results are generally 
consistent with Tables 3 to 7, with some variations by gender. The DID estimates are positive 
and statistically significant in the first summer for both women and men. All gains in certificate 
and diploma completion rates accrue to women. YRP eligible women who enrolled in a 
certificate program are 5.8 percentage points more likely to receive a certificate within one year, 
and YRP eligible women are 0.8 percentage points more likely to earn a diploma. The gain in 
associate degree completion rates, however, is concentrated among men. YRP eligible men are 
1.2 percentage points more likely to have completed an associate degree in 2.5 years. 
The YRP seems to induce more YRP eligible women to work in the first term, yet YRP 
eligible men tend to earn more on average in that term. In the third year of college enrollment, 
YRP eligible students of both genders experience similar earnings gains. 
Table 9 examines the same set of outcomes by the age of enrollment. Pell Grants may 
have a different impact on the group of students who enroll within two years of high school 
graduation versus those attend later (Seftor & Turner, 2002). The DID estimates on the amount 
of YRP received and credits earned in the first summer are higher for older students. The gains in 
completion rates and earnings are concentrated among older students. These findings are 
consistent with the research previously mentioned that investigated the effect of Pell Grants on 




DID Estimates of the Effect of YRP Eligibility by Gender 
Outcomes Post*Full-Time SE N Subgroup 
Enrolled in Short-
Term Programs 
1. Pell amount in summer 291*** [16] 18,015 Women  
 
349*** [21] 8,583 Men  
 
456*** [65] 1,518 Women X 
 
444*** [67] 1,114 Men X 
2. Credits earned in summer 0.706*** [0.084] 18,015 Women  
 
0.630*** [0.120] 8,583 Men  
 
1.598*** [0.354] 1,518 Women X 
 
0.704* [0.374] 1,114 Men X 
3. Earned certificate in one year 0.004 [0.003] 18,015 Women  
 
0.003 [0.007] 8,583 Men  
 
0.058*** [0.020] 1,518 Women X 
 
-0.005 [0.023] 1,114 Men X 
4. Earned diploma in 2.5 years 0.008** [0.004] 18,015 Women  
 
-0.001 [0.006] 8,583 Men  
 
0.005 [0.014] 1,518 Women X 
 
-0.024 [0.018] 1,114 Men X 
5. Earned associate degree in 2.5 years 0.003 [0.004] 18,015 Women  
 
0.012* [0.007] 8,583 Men  
 
0.017 [0.017] 1,518 Women X 
 
-0.006 [0.020] 1,114 Men X 
5. Employed in the fall 0.043*** [0.015] 18,015 Women  
 
0.033 [0.021] 8,583 Men  
 
0.034 [0.056] 1,518 Women X 
 
0.080 [0.059] 1,114 Men X 
6. Earnings in the fall 107* [65] 18,015 Women  
 
304*** [100] 8,583 Men  
 
71 [285] 1,518 Women X 
 
414 [293] 1,114 Men X 
7. Employed in the third year -0.005 [0.013] 18,015 Women  
 
0.029 [0.019] 8,583 Men  
 
-0.043 [0.052] 1,518 Women X 
 
-0.009 [0.056] 1,114 Men X 
8. Earnings in the third year  706*** [204] 18,015 Women  
 
641* [355] 8,583 Men  
 
872 [811] 1,518 Women X 
 
1,310 [1,072] 1,114 Men X 
Note. Each row is for a separate regression. Coefficients are for the interaction of post-2008 indicator variable with full-time 
enrollment status in the first term. Robust standard errors are in brackets. All specifications include post-2008 indicator variable 
and full-time enrollment status in the first term. All regressions control for race/ethnicity, gender, high school graduation 
status, grade point average and credits earned in the first term, expected family contribution and Pell Grant amount in the first 
term, intent at college entry, and college and major fixed effects. Panels 5 to 8 also include year of work experience and its 
squared term as covariates. 





DID Estimates of the Effect of YRP Eligibility by Age at Enrollment 





1. Pell amount in summer 396*** [17] 16,300 ≥20  
 190*** [18] 10,298 <20  
 481*** [53] 1,929 ≥20 X 
 419*** [97] 703 <20 X 
2. Credits earned in summer 0.871*** [0.095] 16,300 ≥20  
 0.365*** [0.096] 10,298 <20  
 1.371*** [0.303] 1,929 ≥20 X 
 0.788 [0.484] 703 <20 X 
3. Earned certificate in one year 0.008* [0.004] 16,300 ≥20  
 -0.006* [0.004] 10,298 <20  
 0.046** [0.018] 1,929 ≥20 X 
 0.000 [0.022] 703 <20 X 
4. Earned diploma in 2.5 years 0.007 [0.005] 16,300 ≥20  
 0.001 [0.004] 10,298 <20  
 -0.022 [0.014] 1,929 ≥20 X 
 0.008 [0.014] 703 <20 X 
5. Earned associate degree in 2.5 years 0.010* [0.005] 16,300 ≥20  
 -0.002 [0.004] 10,298 <20  
 0.002 [0.015] 1,929 ≥20 X 
 0.029 [0.023] 703 <20 X 
5. Employed in the fall 0.028* [0.015] 16,304 ≥20  
 0.076*** [0.019] 10,294 <20  
 0.043 [0.046] 1,929 ≥20 X 
 0.075 [0.085] 703 <20 X 
6. Earnings in the fall 209*** [79] 16,304 ≥20  
 190*** [53] 10,294 <20  
 203 [247] 1,929 ≥20 X 
 208 [234] 703 <20 X 
7. Employed in the third year 0.015 [0.014] 16,304 ≥20  
 0.002 [0.017] 10,294 <20  
 -0.029 [0.043] 1,929 ≥20 X 
 0.036 [0.078] 703 <20 X 
8. Earnings in the third year 1,330*** [254] 16,304 ≥20  
 -305 [226] 10,294 <20  
 1,497* [783] 1,929 ≥20 X 
  1,429 [1,149] 703 <20 X 
Note. Each row is for a separate regression. Coefficients are for the interaction of post-2008 indicator variable with full-time 
enrollment status in the first term. Robust standard errors are in brackets. All specifications include post-2008 indicator variable 
and full-time enrollment status in the first term. All regressions control for race/ethnicity, gender, high school graduation 
status, grade point average and credits earned in the first term, expected family contribution and Pell Grant amount in the first 
term, intent at college entry, and college and major fixed effects. Panels 5 to 8 also include year of work experience and its 
squared term as covariates. 
***p < .01, **p < .05, * p < .1. 
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6.6 Robustness Check 
The discussion of the estimation strategy in Section 5 provides some checks on the 
composition of full-time versus part-time students before and after the YRP implementation. 
Figure 6 illustrates a more robust test of the parallel trend assumption by showing the year-by-
year interaction term on a set of outcomes controlling for enrollment status, enrolled year, and all 
other covariates in previous tables. The coefficient shown is similar to the 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  
interaction term shown in Tables 5 to 9. Instead of interacting 𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  with pre and post-2009 
enrollment status, 𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  is interacted with the actual year of enrollment: 𝑌𝑌𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 .  
For the parallel trend assumption to hold, the coefficients from the 2009 cohort should 
ideally be different from the 2006, 2007, and 2008 cohorts, which should be similar to each 
other. At the very least, there should not be a steady upward or downward trend over time. 
Figure 6 shows support for this assumption and a strong effect of YRP eligibility for all 
academic outcomes except for diploma attainment. 
While the recession does not seem to have influenced student characteristics or academic 
behavior, it may have influenced earnings three years from college enrollment. For example, the 
third year of the 2006 cohort is 2009, which occurs near the end of the recession. The third year 
of the 2009 cohort is 2012, by which time the economy is recovering. Figure 7 displays the 
earnings levels in the second and third year from college entry for the whole sample and shows a 
relatively flat trend across time and finds no violation of the parallel trend assumption.  
The flat trend also points to a lack of effect of YRP eligibility on third year earnings. The 
lack of effect is possibly due to the short follow-up, and an effect may be more prominent if 
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Overall, I find that students who are eligible for the YRP receive more Pell Grant 
funding in the summer, which then leads to gains in credits earned, completion rates, and 
earnings. YRP eligibility has almost no impact on loans, yet it reduces other state and 
institutional aid slightly. Subgroup analysis suggests that YRP eligibility has a larger 
impact on short-term credential completion rates for women and on the associate degree 
graduation rates for men. Older students also experience larger gains than younger 




As both college tuition and the enrollment of nontraditional students continue to 
rise, policies that can help students graduate in a timely matter become increasingly 
important. Students enrolled in community colleges are often older, employed full-time, 
minority, or first-generation students with low incomes who have higher financial 
constraints. The traditional Pell Grant covers only two semesters of full-time enrollment, 
leaving no support for low-income students who want to take courses in the summer. The 
short-lived YRP program gave extra summer funding to those who enrolled full-time in 
their prior two semesters. I exploit the exogenous variations of the timing of the 
introduction of the policy and its eligibility requirements to shed light on the impact of 
providing summer tuition support for community college students in a single state. 
Using a DID approach, I find that for each $1,000 of YRP disbursement per YRP 
eligible student, the likelihood of summer enrollment among YRP eligible students 
increases by 27 percentage points, the likelihood of associate degree completion increases 
by 2.2 percent points, and third year earnings from college entry increase by $2,182. A 
“back-of-the-envelope” calculation using a tax rate of 15 percent indicates that the tax 
revenue raised from the earnings gains can pay back the cost of the program in around 
three years.  
Breaking down the findings by age of enrollment shows that the completion and 
labor market gains accrue primarily to adult students who first enrolled at age 20 or 
above. The estimated increase in enrollment is substantially larger than the consensus 
result of a 3 to 6 percentage point gain per $1,000 of grant disbursement from various 
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sources found in research literature noted in Deming and Dynarski (2010). The main 
reason for this is that the current study includes all Pell eligible students in the sample, 
which avoids limiting the analysis to only those students around the Pell-eligible 
threshold or those who may have been hindered by the financial aid application. I also do 
not find any crowding-out effect on loans as Marx and Turner (2017) did. Additionally, 
the crowding-out effect on state and institutional aid that I do find seems too small to 
have a substantial influence on the positive outcomes. 
Despite the limitations of short follow-up and the use of a single cohort of 
students eligible for the YRP, this paper provides the only evidence to date on the effect 
of the YRP on completion rates and labor market outcomes. It also provides an upper 
boundary for the effect of need-based grants. This research may provide important 
guidance to the federal government, policymakers, and advocacy groups as the YRP has 
been restored, beginning as early as summer 2017.   
This paper also contributes to a broader set of conversations. Does more money 
matter in higher education? Results from this study suggests that it does and that adult 
students especially benefit from increased educational funding. Are there certain 
conditions that would maximize the impact of grants? Though not directly tested, the 
sample restrictions in this paper provide a kind of best-case scenario for grant aid, in 
which individuals with high financial need who experience no complications with aid 
applications comprise the sample, and the estimated results are better than those found in 
other grant studies. The YRP is also small enough that it does not trigger any substantial 
crowding-out effect on institutional aid or any changes in employment during college. 
These findings suggest that there exist some optimal conditions regarding the student 
composition, structure, and design of grant programs that can maximize their impact. 
And finally, are individuals willing to go to college year-round? This study shows that 
when provided an incentive, more students enroll in courses in the summer term in 
addition to the fall and spring semesters. In fact, as tuition continues to rise, finding ways 





Abraham, K. G., & Clark, M. A. (2006). Financial aid and students’ college decisions 
evidence from the District of Columbia Tuition Assistance Grant Program. 
Journal of Human Resources, 41(3), 578–610. 
Alon, S. (2011). Who benefits most from financial aid? The heterogeneous effect of 
need‐based grants on students’ college persistence. Social Science Quarterly, 
92(3), 807–829. 
Bannister, K., & Kramer, D. (2015). The impact of the Year-Round Pell Grant on summer 
credit hour completion: A quasi-experimental case study at Hillsborough 
Community College (working paper). Gainesville, FL: University of Florida, 
College of Education. 
Barr, A. (2015). From the battlefield to the schoolyard: The short-term impact of the 
post-9/11 GI Bill. Journal of Human Resources, 50(3), 580–613.  
Bettinger, E. (2004). How financial aid effects persistence (NBER Working Paper No. 
10242). Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. Retrieved from 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w10242.pdf.  
Bettinger, E. P., Long, B. T., Oreopoulos, P., & Sanbonmatsu, L. (2012). The role of 
application assistance and information in college decisions: Results from the 
H&R Block FAFSA experiment. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127(3), 
1205–1242. 
Bound, J., & Turner, S. (2002). Going to war and going to college: Did World War II and 
the GI Bill increase educational attainment for returning veterans? Journal of 
labor economics, 20(4), 784–815. 
Carruthers, C. K., & Welch, J. G. (2015). Not whether, but where? Pell Grants and 
college choices (No. 2015-04). Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee. 
Castleman, B. L., & Long, B. T. (2016). Looking beyond enrollment: The causal effect of 
need-based grants on college access, persistence, and graduation. Journal of 
Labor Economics, 34(4), 1023–1073. 
Congressional Budget Office. (2013). The federal Pell Grant program: Recent growth 
and policy options. Washington, DC: Author.  
Deming, D., & Dynarski, S. (2010). College aid. In P. B. Levine & D. J. Zimmerman 
(Eds.), Targeting investments in children: Fighting poverty when resources are 
limited (pp. 283–302). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Denning, J. T. (2017). Born under a lucky star: financial aid, college completion, labor 
supply, and credit constraints (Upjohn Institute Working Paper 17-267). 
Kalamazoo, MI: W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. 
37 
Dynarski, S. (2000). Hope for whom? Financial aid for the middle class and its impact 
on college attendance (NBER Working Paper No. 7756). Cambridge, MA: 
National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Dynarski, S. (2003). Does aid matter? Measuring the effect of student aid on college 
attendance and completion. The American Economic Review, 3(1), 279–288 
Dynarski, S. (2004). Who benefits from the education saving incentives? Income, 
educational expectations and the value of the 529 and Coverdell. National Tax 
Journal, 57(2), 359–383. 
Dynarski, S., & Scott- Clayton, J. (2006). The cost of complexity in Federal Student Aid: 
Lessons from optimal tax theory and behavioral economics. NBER Working 
Paper no. 12227. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, May. 
Dynarski, S., & Scott-Clayton, J. (2008). Complexity and targeting in federal student aid: 
A quantitative analysis. In J. M. Poterba (Ed.), Tax policy and the economy (Vol. 
22, pp. 109–150. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Dynarski, S., & Scott-Clayton, J. (2013). Financial aid policy: Lessons from research 
(NBER Working Paper No. 18710). Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of 
Education Research.  
Friedmann, E. (2016, November). The effect of the year-round Pell Grant on enrollment. 
Presentation at the 2016 APPAM Fall Research Conference, Washington, DC. 
Fullerton, D., & Metcalf, G. E. (2002). Tax incidence. Handbook of public economics, 4, 
1787–1872. 
Goldrick-Rab, S., Kelchen, R., Harris, D., & Benson, J. (2016). Reducing income 
inequality in educational attainment: Experimental evidence on the impact of 
financial aid on college completion. American Journal of Sociology, 
121(6):1762–1817. 
Hansen, W. L. (1983). Impact of student financial aid on access. In J. Fromkin (Ed.), The 
Crisis in Higher Education (pp. 84–96). New York, NY: Academy of Sciences.  
Kane, T. J. (1994). College entry by Blacks since 1970: The role of college costs, family 
background, and the returns to education. Journal of political Economy, 102(5), 
878–911. 
Kane, T. J. (1995). Rising public college tuition and college entry: How well do public 
subsidies promote access to college? (NBER Working Paper No. 5164). 
Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Kane, T. J. (2003). A quasi-experimental estimate of the impact of financial aid on 
college-going (NBER Working Paper No. 9703). Cambridge, MA: National 
Bureau of Economic Research. 
38 
Katsinas, S., Davis, J., Friedel, J., Koh, J., & Grant, P. (2011). The impact of new Pell 
Grant restrictions on community colleges: A three state study of Alabama, 
Arkansas and Mississippi. Alabama: The University of Alabama Education Policy 
Center.  
Katsinas, S., Davis, J., Koh, J., & Grant, P. (2012). Pell Grant’s vital role in lifting up 
Mississippi. Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Education Policy 
Center.  
Lovenheim, M., & Owens, E. (2014). Does federal financial aid affect college 
enrollment? Evidence from drug offenders and the Higher Education Act of 1998. 
Journal of Urban Economics, 81(C), 1–13.  
Marx, B., & Turner, L. J. (2017). Borrowing trouble? Student loans, the cost of 
borrowing and implications for the effectiveness of need-based grant aid (NBER 
Working Paper No. 20850). Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic 
Research.  
Office of Management and Budget. (2011). Fiscal year 2012 terminations, reductions, 
and savings: Budget of the U.S. Government. Retrieved from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2012/assets/trs.pdf 
Rubin, R. B. (2011). The Pell and the poor: A regression-discontinuity analysis of on-
time college enrollment. Research in Higher Education, 52(7), 675–692. 
Schudde, L., & Scott-Clayton, J. (2014). Pell Grants as performance-based aid? An 
examination of satisfactory academic progress requirements in the nation’s 
largest need-based aid program (A CAPSEE Working Paper). New York, NY: 
Center for Analysis of Postsecondary Education and Employment.  
Seftor, N. & Turner, S. (2002). Back to school: Federal student aid policy and adult 
college enrollment. The Journal of Human Resources, 37(2), 336–352. 
Turner, L. J. (2014). The road to Pell is paved with good intentions: The economic 
incidence of federal student grant aid. College Park, MD: University of 
Maryland, Department of Economics.  
Turner, S. (1998). Does federal aid affect the price students pay for college? Evidence 
from the Pell Program (mimeo). Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia. 
U.S. Department of Education. (2011). Fiscal Year 2012 Department of Education 
Justification of Appropriation Estimates to the Congress: Student Financial 
Assistance. Retrieved from 
http://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/budget12/justifications/index.html  
39 
U.S. Department of Education, Office of Postsecondary Education. (2013). Federal Pell 
Grant program annual data reports. Retrieved from 
http://www2.ed.gov/finaid/prof/resources/data/pell-2012-13/pell-eoy-2012-
13.html 
 
